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MOHAN MUNASINGHE*

Energy Strategies for Oil Importing
Developing Countriest
INTRODUCTION

The two rapid oil price increases during 1973-74 and 1979-80 have left
a lasting impact on the entire world. While the economies of all countries,
except the oil exporters, have suffered, the most adverse consequences were
felt by the group of oil importing developing countries (OIDCs) (see Appendix for a complete list of both low and middle income OIDCs).
This paper seeks to identify possible adjustment strategies that the
OIDCs might adopt in the coming years. Before attempting to do so, two
salient points should be recognized. First, the economic adjustments that
OIDCs had to make in the past were, to a large extent, governed by the
global environment because of tight international linkages via trade, borrowing, investment, and aid. Therefore, any analysis of the OIDCs' future
prospects and policy options must begin with a general understanding of
how the world economy coped with the two oil-price shocks, and how
external conditions specifically affected the oil importers. Second, energy
related problems cannot be meaningfully separated from development
issues, especially in the context of the developing countries. Accordingly,
potentially useful strategies for energy management and planning are
closely linked with successful development policies for management and
adjustment of national economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the upcoming
section seeks to analyze the impact of the past oil crises on the world
economy in general, and on the oil importers in particular. Energy and
economic development issues in the OIDCs are described in the next
section. In the final section, future energy options and adjustment strategies that are likely to be successful in the OIDCs are discussed.
THE EFFECTS OF PAST OIL PRICE INCREASES
World Economy
During the past decade, international oil prices have risen sharply twice,
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of the Sri Lanka government or the World Bank.
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in 1973-74 and 1979-80 (see Figure 1). Overall real crude oil prices
have risen by a factor of six over a ten year period since 1972. The
responses of the world economy to the two energy shocks have exhibited
similarities as well as differences.' In both cases, the economic growth
rates of the industrialized and developing countries declined, but the
second recession was less precipitous and longer lasting, as shown in
Figure 2.
The differences in response may be attributed to the macroeconomic
policies adopted by the major industrial powers in each case. During the
first crisis, conventional monetary and fiscal expansion policies were
adopted to counteract the recessionary effects of high oil import bills.
The oil crisis, however, helped to highlight structural rigidities and defects
in the western economies which required structural adjustment rather than
traditional macroeconomic stabilization policies. Protection of high cost
industries and wage rigidities in the struggle to maintain high levels of
money income led to wage-price spirals. The resulting persistent inflation,
however, eroded real growth, and high interest rates and investment
uncertainty deepened the recession. The first oil price increase did, however, result in a move towards energy conservation and substitution away
from petroleum, which began to pay off handsomely by the end of the
1970s.
Most of the industrialized countries adopted somewhat different policies
after 1979-80, which were based on their experiences during the previous
decade. Tight monetary policies controlled inflation, but large fiscal deficits and high short term interest rates discouraged or delayed investment,
increased unemployment, and prolonged the recession. Only towards late
1983 was there some promise of a world-wide economic upturn in 1984.
The OIDCs continue to be highly vulnerable to developments in the
world economy, not only because of high oil import costs, but also due
to shrinkage of export markets, official aid flows, access to international
credit, and private foreign investments in domestic economies. Each
downturn in the industrialized nations had corresponding adverse impacts
on the developing countries, although some (especially the newly industrializing far eastern group) were able to cope better than others. Specific
mechanisms by which the oil price shocks have affected petroleum importers are analyzed next.'
Balance of Payment Effects
The drastic changes in the price of oil in the 1970s had major financial
1. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1983 (1983).
2. M. MUNASINGHE & G. SCHRAMM, ENERGY ECONOMICS, DEMAND MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION POLICY (1983).
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and balance-of-payments repercussions on the oil importing countries.
Total energy imports as a percent of total merchandise exports in 1960
had amounted to less than 11 percent worldwide. In 1977, energy import
costs had increased to between 16 and 40 percent of exports for the lowincome, non-oil producing countries; to 24 percent for the middle-income
countries; and to 20 percent for the industrialized countries. However,
these average percentages hide rates of dependency that are much higher
for a number of individual countries. Some of them, such as Jordan,
Pakistan, Panama, Syria, and Turkey, spent between 40 and 90 percent
of export earnings for oil imports, and the United States and Japan spent
about 31 percent and 32 percent, respectively. Given the more than 100
percent oil price increases in 1979-80, these percentages have increased
substantially since then, in most cases. Projections made for 1990 for
member countries of the Asian Development Bank indicate that energy
imports may account for between 55 and 120 percent of export earnings
in low-income countries, and between 17 and 50 percent for the middleincome group, in spite of the fact that the projections also foresee a
significant substitution of other energy resources for oil. 3
These increased foreign exchange requirements for oil imports were a
major contributor to a significant deterioration in the balance of payments
of many of the oil importing countries. As a result, their external debt
load increased sharply. This is particularly true for developing countries.
Since much of their oil expenditure has to be financed through foreign
exchange borrowings, rather than increased exports, the accumulation of
debt and declining international credit-worthiness of many importing developing countries are major unresolved issues. The special problems of
the third world are discussed in greater detail later.
Direct Macroeconomic Effects
One of the most important direct effects of the energy price increases
in the 1970s was the resulting fall in real incomes of oil importing countries. World oil prices rose by some 350 percent in 1973-74, and by
about 140 percent in 1979-80. These increases occurred in response to
relatively small reductions in available world supplies, proving that the
short-run demand elasticity for oil is low. In both periods, panic buying
reinforced the upward pressures on prices, with the result that spot market
prices (which account for between 5 to 15 percent of world trade) rose
even faster than the announced contractual prices. Given the uneven
distribution of oil producing and importing countries, these drastic price
rises resulted in major real income transfers from importing to producing
3. T. L. SANKAR & G. SCHRAMM, ASIAN ENERGY PROBLEMS (1982).
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countries. The consequence was, of course, that real income in the importing countries had to fall.
Assume the share or fraction of energy costs in GNP is ES. Then, in
the worst case, where the price-elasticity of energy demand is zero and
no energy substitution is possible, a simple and essentially static analysis
shows that an increase in energy process of p percent will reduce real
national income at most by [p x ES/(1 - ES)] percent. Assuming a typical
value of 0.1 for ES, real income will fall by a maximum of 1.1 percent
following a ten percent rise in energy costs, neglecting the dynamic effects
of the energy price shock to be discussed later. Thus, if the energy cost
share, ES, is small, this will reduce the adverse impact on national
income, basically because the economy is less dependent on energy and
therefore less vulnerable to the price increase. However, for a given value
of ES, the greater the possibilities of substituting other relatively cheaper
inputs for energy in various productive activities (i.e., a higher value for
price elasticity), the smaller the decline in real national income.
The direct effects will be the same whether the price of imported energy
rises or domestic energy sources become more expensive to exploit. Only
countries with significant amounts of cheap (and preferably exportable)
energy resources will not be adversely affected. It is important to realize
the distinction between national income and national output. Thus, if
there is little substitution of other inputs such as capital and labor for
energy, real output or GNP will be relatively unaffected. But, since more
of this product is used to pay for expensive energy, less will be available
as wages and profits, i.e., real incomes and the standard of living will
decline. Paradoxically, the greater the substitution of other inputs for
energy in production, the larger the fall in real GNP, but the smaller the
reduction in real national income.
Dynamic Effects
The dynamic effects of an energy price increase occur as the economy
seeks to adjust to this sudden shock, encumbered by wage and price
ridigities and constraints. The sharper and more unexpected the increase,
the more severe the shock. As discussed in the previous section, the
increased share of output claimed by energy costs implies reduced incomes
for other factors of production such as capital and labor. However, in the
post-1973 period various economic agents in the oil importing countries
sought to maintain their real incomes by raising wages and prices of other
goods. These actions simply boosted money incomes (with little effect
on real income) and triggered a spiral of wage-price inflation.
In addition to the inflationary effects mentioned above, the adjustment
of the economy will also cause real output to fall. All the well-known
adverse effects such as increased unemployment, decreased GNP growth
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rate, and general recession, were felt in oil importing countries after the
1973 and 1979-80 oil price increases. In many cases, the tendency of
workers to resist decreases in real wage levels and increases in other
input costs resulted in reduced profits. This led to layoffs and decreases
in output. At the same time, uncertainty regarding prices, interest rates,
and profits resulted in reduced investment. Consumer demand also reacted
negatively to reduced future real incomes. Thus the world economy went
into recession during the period 1973-75, with the uniformity and synchronization of country responses being enhanced by the tight linkage
due to large trade and capital flows among them.
Future Trends
These immediate, macroeconomic effects of the income transfers from
oil importers to oil exporters are diminishing, however, as price-induced
substitutions of other energy resources and conservation measures take
hold. In the long-run, the higher oil prices lead to a decline in the use
of oil, even though it is not clear at this point in time if world consumption
rates will fall in absolute terms or only relative to rates that would have
prevailed at lower prices. In the industrialized world, oil consumption in
1980 had actually declined relative to 1978, the year of peak consumption.
In the developing countries, however, oil consumption is likely to rise
further in order to support the essential process of economic development
and growth, and to switch over from traditional to commercial, energydependent, modem methods of production.
Oil-substitution, itself, generally requires higher initial investment to
provide the same level of service that would have been obtained with the
use of oil. This substitution process is costly. Although the average costs
of electric energy will be lower for atomic or coal-fired alternatives than
for oil, over the life expectancies of the respective plants, the problem
is that higher initial capital investments are needed per unit of output. To
bring about such substitution requires a significant increase in the amount
of investment relative to the amount of useful output produced. Higher
savings and lower consumption rates are needed to finance these shifts
in the capital/output ratios of energy-producing and energy-consuming
equipment and facilities. But these increases in capital requirements put
a major strain on world capital markets and are a contributing factor to
the higher real costs of capital in recent years. These increased capital
costs have placed a heavy burden on the already capital-short, oil-importing, developing countries. They also have reduced the economic
advantage of oil-substitution.
Because there is less time for dynamic adjustment, sudden increases
in the world oil price are more detrimental to the economies of oil importers than a gradual price rise. While there is general agreement that
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oil prices will continue to rise (because oil is a depleting resource), the
rate of increase is less certain. Recent estimates range between zero and
three percent per year, on average, over the next two decades. Greater
conservation efforts by oil imorters will help to limit world oil price
increases, whereas unforeseen supply disruptions in oil producing areas
could lead to sharp price rises.
There will also have to be considerable adjustment in the oil refining
sectors of many countries. As more refining capacity comes on-stream
in the OPEC countries during the 1980s, many less efficient refineries in
other countries will have to be phased out. Also, as heavier crudes that
yield relatively more of the heavier refinery fractions predominate over
lighter crudes in the future, and demand for fuel oil drops relative to the
lighter products, refineries will have to adapt, e.g., by installing cracking
facilities. This renders obsolete most of the existing distillation-only refining capacity, and puts a premium on high-cost, cracking facilities that
are in short supply.
OIL IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRY (OIDC) ISSUES
The problems encountered by the oil importing developing countries
require special analysis because these nations are the least well equipped
to deal with the increases in petroleum prices. Most of the oil importing
developing countries, such as Brazil and Korea, financed their increased
energy import bills by external borrowings following the 1973 oil price
increase. This was necessary because they were unable to boost exports
sufficiently to balance their foreign trade. A few, like Taiwan, sought to
cut back sharply on their domestic demand for oil. On the whole, the
OIDCs succeeded in cushioning their economies from the oil price shock,
and posted a 4.5 percent growth rate of real GNP, while the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries were deep
in recession. However, the increasing debt service burden of the OIDCs
makes it unlikely that continued foreign financing of energy needs can
be sustained indefinitely into the future. Between 1970 and 1979, their
debt service as percentage of GNP increased from 1.2 to 2.7 percent for
low income countries, and from 1.5 to 2.2 percent for middle income
countries. The future looks even bleaker for a number of them. For 12
major energy importing Asian countries, the Asian Development Bank
predicts that energy imports as a percent of GNP will amount to almost
15 percent by 1990, as against a range of 3 to 7'1/2 percent in 1978.'
The more detailed pattern of foreign exchange borrowings by OIDCs
shows that there was a sharp increase in borrowing after the 1973 oil
price increase, which gradually decreased up to 1978, only to rise again
4. Id.
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following thevolatility of international oil markets during 1979-80. Many
of these loans were obtained from private commercial banks, and therefore
not under concessionary terms usually provided by international aid agencies. These rapid increases in short term borrowings have increased the
debt service burden of several countries to dangerous levels. For example,
by 1985, the more industrialized, middle income OIDCs are projected to
spend about 29 percent of their export earnings to meet interest and
amortization payments on their foreign debt.'
Increased borrowing immediately after a sudden oil price increase is
generally in the interest of the OIDCs. An economy is usually most rigid
in the short run, with few possibilities for energy substitution in production
and consumption. Therefore it makes sense to borrow more heavily in
the initial period following the oil price increase, assuming that energy
substitution and conservation programs will provide greater flexibility in
later years. However, it is clear that the ability to withstand repeated
energy shocks will be diminished if the magnitude and frequency of these
price increases is too great to permit economies to adjust to new equilibria
and to allow debt service ratios to fall to acceptable levels. While the
demand for foreign loans may not be very sensitive to the cost of borrowing (i.e., interest rates and terms of repayment), the supply of funds,
especially from the commercial banks, will depend critically on credit
worthiness. Already, preliminary results indicate that the OIDCs were not
able to cushion their economies from the effects of the most recent oil
price shocks as well as they did in the post-1973 period.
Both the direct and dynamic effects of higher energy costs discussed
earlier will continue to reduce already low real incomes and living standards, decrease output and employment levels, and fuel inflation in the
OIDCs. Fortunately, in the next decade or so, energy substitution and
conservation policies will help to alleviate these problems. However, the
third world will still need increasing amounts of energy to sustain its
drive for economic growth and industrialization. Thus, according to the
World Bank, total commercial energy consumption in oil importing developing countries will increase from 12.4 million barrels a day of oil
equivalent in 1980 to 22.8 million barrels by 1990.6 Not all of this
increase, of course, will be in the form of oil consumption. For example,
for 19 Asian countries, oil dependence is projected to decrease from some
78 percent in 1978 to 65 percent by 1990, even though in absolute terms
oil consumption in these countries is expected to double. 7 As oil de5. THE WORLD BANK, THE ENERGY TRANSITION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1983).
6. Id.
7. U.N. Economic Committee for Asia and the Pacific, 32 Econ. Bull. for Asia and the Pacific
46-62 (1981).
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pendence declines relative to total GNP, the negative effects of high and
rising oil prices will become less significant for income and employment.
As mentioned earlier, energy related investments in developing countries for developing new energy sources and for conservation programs
will also be substantial. According to estimates by the World Bank, for
example, the energy-related investment needs of the developing countries
as a whole are projected to rise from some 34.4 billion U.S. dollars in
1980 to approximately 82.2 billion dollars per year by 1990 (in 1980
U.S. dollars).' This represents an average annual increase of 12.3 percent
over the decade.
In summary, solving the energy problems of the third world will be a
formidable challenge. In the past, commercial banks have been willing
to act as intermediaries by holding loans from OIDCs, and issuing their
own internationally recognized instruments to finance oil payments and
energy related investments. Since this cannot continue indefinitely, greater
direct flows of petro-dollars from the oil-surplus countries to the OIDCs
in the form of concessionary loans for investments, etc. may be required.
More aid from both multilateral and bilateral sources, as well as higher
levels of private foreign investment, will be required. The developed
countries should also be willing to run greater trade deficits than OIDCs.
We note that any evolution of international economic relationships will
depend on many difficult and unknown political factors. Energy will be
only one issue, albeit an important one, to be thrashed out within some
broader framework such as the North-South dialogue and the new international econmic order (NIEO) discussions. It is very clear, however,
that whatever the outcome of international developments, the more efficient use of energy, and demand management and conservation policies
pursued within individual countries, as well as more effective exploitation
of indigenous energy resources and supply management, will play an
important role in reducing the adverse effects of the energy crisis in those
countries willing to adopt appropriate policies.
ROLE OF ENERGY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Because of the intimate link between energy and development issues,
we will examine the energy planning and management framework as well
as the policy instruments available to tackle the OIDCs' energy problems,
before setting out the strategies to be adopted. 9
It is generally accepted that the broad rationale underlying modem
energy management and planning is to make the best use of available
8. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
9. Munasinghe, Integrated National Energy Planning in Developing Countries, 4 NAT. RESOURCES F. 359 (1980).
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energy resources for promoting economic development, and improving
social welfare and the quality of life. Therefore, energy planning is an
essential part of the overall management of the national economy, and
should be carried out in close coordination with the latter. However, in
energy management and planning, the principal emphasis is on the comprehensive and disaggregate analysis of the energy sector with due regard
to the main interactions with the rest of the economy, and among the
different energy subsectors themselves. The efficient management of government energy-related corporations and, where necessary, the provision
of correct investment and price signals to the private sector, are an integral
part of successfully implementing national energy policies.
In a strictly technical sense, the best strategy might be to seek the least
costly method of meeting future energy requirements. However, energy
planning also includes a variety of other and often conflicting objectives,
such as reducing dependence on foreign sources, supplying basic energy
needs of the poor, reducing the trade and foreign exchange deficits,
priority development of special regions or sectors of the economy, raising
sufficient revenue to finance energy sector development (at least partially),
ensuring continuity of supply, maintaining price stability, preserving the
environment, and so on.
In general, energy planning requires analysis at the following three
hierarchical levels in relation to fundamental national objectives: (1) links
between the energy sector and the rest of the economy; (2) interactions
between different subsectors within the energy sector; and (3) activities
in each individual energy subsector. The steps involved in the planning
procedure usually include energy supply and demand analyses and forecasting, energy balancing, policy formation, and impact analysis, to meet
short, mid, and long-range goals. Implementation of the results of this
analysis could be considered within the framework of a formal national
energy master plan (EMP), or a more decentralized policy package that
relies on voluntary responses of private energy producers and consumers
to market prices. This will generally require the coordinated use of a
number of interrelated policy tools such as: (1) physical controls and
legislation; (2) technical methods (including research and development);
(3) direct investments or investment inducing policies; (4) education and
propaganda; and (5) pricing.
Energy planning may be carried out initially at a relatively simple
level, but, as data and analytical capabilities improve, more sophisticated
techniques, including computer modeling, may be used. The institutional
structure could also be rationalized by setting up a central energy authority
or ministry of energy, whose principal focus should be on energy planning
and policy-making. Some central guidance and coordination of the many
policy tools, energy supplying institutions, and consuming sectors is
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necessary even in countries in which energy supply activities are dominated by the private sector. The influence of government actions in the
various energy subsectors is quite pervasive in all countries. Regardless
of the degree of centralization of planning functions, the execution of
policy and day-to-day operations would remain the responsibility of government institutions or private firms, such as electric utilities or petroleum
corporations, that already exist.
Policy Instruments
The policy tools available for energy planning and management include
pricing, physical controls, technical methods (including research and development), and education and promotion.'" Since these tools are interrelated, their use should be well coordinated. Price is most effective in
the mid and long-term. In terms of economic efficiency, price indicates
the consumer's willingness-to-pay and use-value of energy to the supplier,
while, to the consumers, it signals the present and future opportunity
costs of supply based on various energy sources.
Physical controls are most effective in the short-run when there are
unforeseen shortages of energy. All methods of physically limiting consumption are included in this category (for example, load shedding and
rotating power cuts in the electricity subsector, and reducing the supply
of petrol or banning the use of cars during some periods). Technical
means include, on the supply side, the cheapest means of producing a
given form of energy, the best fuel mix, research and development of
substitute fuels such as wood-alcohol for petrol, and on the demand side,
introducing higher efficiency energy conversion devices such as better
wood burning stoves, etc. Education and promotion include, on the supply
side, efforts to make people aware of external diseconomies such as
pollution, and supportive of reafforestation schemes to preserve the environment; and on the demand side, public education for energy conservation.
Pricing and investment decisions should be closely related. Energy
supply systems (for example, electricity generation, transmission and
distribution, oil and gas wells and pipelines, coal mines, forests), usually
require large capital investments with long lead and life times. Once the
investment decision is made (usually on the basis of the conventional
least cost method of meeting demand by subsector, with due regard for
interfuel substitution possibilities), there is a lock-in effect with respect
to supply. Therefore, prices should be related to the long-term planning
horizon. On the demand side, energy conversion devices (e.g., cars, gas
10. Munasinghe, Third World Energy Policies: Demand Management and Conservation, ENERGY
POLICY 4 (March 1983).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

cookers, electric appliances, machines, etc.) are expensive relative to
average income and have relatively long lifetimes, thus limiting the ability
of consumers to respond to changes in relative fuel prices in the short
run.
FUTURE ENERGY OPTIONS AND ADJUSTMENT STRATEGIES
Global Scenario
The energy prospects of the developing countries, and the OIDCs in
particular, depend on supply-demand projections based on the likely evolution of the world economy. For the period 1985-95, the expected
average annual growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) of the
developing countries and the industrialized countries would be 5.5 and
3.7 percent, respectively. " In the former group, the middle income countries are estimated to grow most rapidly at 5.7 percent, while the low
income Asian countries, with an average growth rate of 4.9 percent, are
expected to do better than their African counterparts having growth rates
averaging only 3.3 percent. Global oil consumption is predicted to increase by only about one percent per year, up to 1995, while the real oil
price is projected to grow at 1.6 percent. Although short-term fluctuations
in energy markets (especially oil) will remain unpredictable, the above
assumptions are reasonable long-run trends, given that oil prices must
eventually approach the costs of potential replacements such as synthetic
fuels. In particular, short-term declines in world petroleum prices should
not lull the OIDCs into a grossly false sense of security.
Table 1 shows the expected consumption and imports of various forms
of commercial energy in the OIDCs. Although overall annual energy
consumption will grow at five percent, the increase in oil use will be
limited to about half this value. A combination of conservation and indigenous energy resource development policies will permit the OIDCs to
reduce their petroleum imports from 44 to 28 percent of total commercial
energy use between 1980 and 1995. Despite these hoped for successes,
their net oil imports will increase from 295 million tons of oil equivalent
(toe) in 1980 to about 386 million toe by 1995, when oil will still be
supplying 39 percent of total commercial energy needs. Total commercial
energy imports will rise at an average annual rate of three percent, from
288 million toe to 449 million toe, over the same period.
Meanwhile, biomass accounts for as much of the gross energy requirements of OIDCs as commercial fuels. In many countries it is used not
only for fuel but also for construction timber, a total use which is several
fold greater than the safe sustainable yield from already depleted forest
cover. The future consumption of fuelwood will be determined mainly
II. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
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TABLE 1.
Expected Commercial Energy Consumption and Imports
in the Oil Importing Developing Countries
Consumption

Oil
Coal
Natural Gas
Primary Electricity
Total

Imports

1980
Million
toe

1995
Million
toe

1980-95
percent growth
per year

360
186
26
98
670

531
442
120
306
1399

2.6
5.9
10.7
7.9
5.0

1980
Million
toe
296
-6
- 1
0
288

1995
Million
toe

1980-95
percent growth
per year

386
58
5
0
449

1.8
0
3.0

Source: The Energy Transition in Developing Countries, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., August
1983, Chapter 1.

by the availability of supply. Unless significant afforestation efforts are
undertaken, accessible forest cover will disappear within the next two or
three decades, especially in the low-income Asian and African OIDCs.
In addition to the hardships imposed on the predominantly rural poor in
these countries due to the inability to meet basic energy needs, other
undesirable effects, including topsoil erosion, declining agricultural productivity, desertification, reservoir siltation, and reduced retention of water
in catchment areas, will also manifest themselves.
Broad Energy Options
The principal energy options available to OIDCs are: (a) improving
the efficiency of both energy supply and consumption for short- and midrun gains, and (b) increasing the pace of development of indigenous
energy resources, and restructuring their economies for longer-run payoffs.
Energy Efficiency
In most countries, the highest return on investments in the energy sector
today may be realized from projects directed at increasing energy efficiency. On the demand side, energy efficiency improvements or conservation and demand management measures should be vigorously pursued
by providing energy consumers with the latest technical knowledge, financial incentives through appropriate price signals and taxes or subsidies,
and educational and promotional information. While the concept of energy
conservation is intuitively appealing in a period of increased costs and
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scarcity of energy, the desirability of specific energy conservation policies
must be verified by applying specific tests that compare their costs and
benefits.
Two purely technical measures of the efficiency of energy use may be
derived from the first and second laws of thermodynamics. The principal
weakness of these measures is that they focus almost exclusively on the
amount of energy used in a particular process and do not take into consideration the necessary inputs of other scarce resources such as capital,
labor, and land. Also, the first and second law criteria may not always
be consistent.
By contrast, a comprehensive and unambiguous test of specific energy
conservation policies is based on the concept of economic efficiency and
cost-benefit analysis. Generally, a conservation measure gives rise to cost
saving benefits, B, due to a reduced consumption or substitution of energy,
and to additional costs, C, of implementing the conservation policy
(including hardware costs), and to costs C2, representing benefits foregone
due to reduced energy consumption. If B exceeds the sum of C and C2 ,
the conservation measure is desirable. However, in some cases, increased
energy consumption may improve overall economic benefits, e.g., if the
actual price of an energy produce is well above its marginal opportunity
cost (MOC), this price should be lowered toward MOC, with a consequent
increase in demand.
In terms of present discounted values, these economic costs and benefits
should be evaluated and compared on a life cycle basis. Appropriate
shadow prices or measures of the opportunity costs of goods and services
must be used to verify whether the given policy will increase economic
welfare from a national viewpoint. If so, the same calculation must be
repeated using market prices to check whether private individuals will
actually find it profitable to adopt these measures. Often, since market
prices diverge from opportunity costs, it may be necessary to change
taxes, prices, and legislation to promote a desirable conservation policy.
Conservation options in transport, buildings, industry, and electricity
supply will now be summarized. The principal purpose of a transportation
system is to physically convey people or goods from one location to
another. Therefore, any measure that increases the payload in terms of
energy used per passenger-mile or ton-mile would help the conservation
effort. Important methods of achieving this result include: changing from
more to less energy intensive transport models or to cheaper fuels; increasing the technical efficiency of energy use of given modes of transportation; and changes in behaviour and overall systems effects.
In the case of lighting, space heating, and cooling of buildings, three
factors affecting the consumption of energy are: behavioral characteristics
and attitudes of occupants; the type of energy-using equipment installed;
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and architectural design practices and materials used. Keeping living and
working space lighted and cool are the chief concerns in the tropics,
where most of the developing countries lie. In these areas, the use of airconditioning is growing rapidly for commercial buildings such as businesses, hotels, etc., and to a lesser extent for residences of upper income
urban and expatriate groups whose numbers, fortunately, are small.
Contrary to widespread belief, many industries are unaware of potential
decreases in energy use that can be realized quite simply and are extremely
cost effective. Because of the concentrated nature of such energy users,
governments as well as energy suppliers and utility companies can be
particularly effective in legislating improvements, counselling, providing
energy audits, and helping consumers carry out technical improvements.
Four broad areas for industrial energy conservation are: (a) waste heat
recovery and cogeneration, (b) other retrofits and improvements in operation, (c) major changes in manufacturing processes and production
methods, and (d) recycling and-recovery of waste materials.
Efficiency improvements may also be realized in energy production
and distribution. Loss reduction in petroleum refinery operations as well
as distribution and retailing activity are areas in which significant gains
could be made. In electric power supply, the three principal opportunities
for conservation arise in (a) generation, (b) transmission, and (c) distribution. Furthermore, conservation at the end-use stage may also be achieved
by two principal methods: improving the technical efficiency of energyusing devices and appliances, or changing the shape and characteristics
of the load through demand management and load control techniques.
Energy Resource Development
OIDCs can reduce their oil import bills and overall energy costs substantially by exploiting and developing their indigenous resources more
vigorously. The greatest potential for increasing domestic commercial
energy production lies in the petroleum, natural gas, coal, hydroelectric,
and nuclear energy subsectors.
The development of these resources requires: (a) better national energy
planning, policy analysis, and formulation of strategies, (b) accelerated
identification, evaluation, exploitation, and marketing of specific energy
resources, and (c) improved capability of energy sector institutions to
manage and operate such projects. In view of the massive and nonmarginal nature of many of these schemes, more pre-investment activity
is required to avoid serious misallocations of investments and waste. At
the same time, the mobilization of both domestic and foreign financial
resources to support the projects themselves requires a major effort by
the OIDCs.
For the OIDCs as a whole, the World Bank estimates that almost $900
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billion (in constant 1982 dollars) will be required over the next decade. 12
About one third of these investment requirements will be in foreign
exchange. To finance these needs, the low-income OIDCs require greater
flows of official assistance on concessional terms. Middle-income OIDCs
will need better access to international capital markets to increase commercial borrowing on the best possible terms, if excessive debt service
burdens are to be avoided. At the same time, the remaining two thirds
of investment must come from domestic sources. Energy sector institutions, like petroleum companies, coal mining firms, and electric utilities,
have to play a vital role in contributing adequately to their own investment
needs. In particular, realistic pricing policies for commercial energy must
be pursued to preserve and strengthen the financial viability of these
energy sector institutions.
Strategiesfor Specific Energy Subsectors
Oil: Exploration and development of petroleum must be rapidly increased by identifying and promoting acreage suitable for drilling, and
on terms sufficiently attractive to international oil companies. At the same
time, domestic expertise and the capabilities of national oil companies
(where appropriate) must be strengthened, not only to monitor the efforts
of multinationals and protect national interests, but also to engage directly
in exploration, development, and refining.
Natural Gas: Although the availability of this resource is far more
widespread than realized earlier, the lack of an integrated gas development
strategy, unavailability of infrastructure, and uncertainty as to future markets, have hindered more rapid development. Because of the very projectspecific nature of gas costs and the high costs of transport to markets,
greater efforts must be devoted to promotion and market development,
pricing, and contractual arrangements for gas use. Domestic institutional
capability must be strengthened and more systematic exploration has to
be carried out.
Coal: Although coal is a much more abundant resource than oil or gas
worldwide, OIDCs are not making adequate use of either indigenous
deposits or inputs of this resource. Coherent strategies for coal use, better
coordination among different coal suppliers (both local producers and
importers), between coal suppliers and users, improved infrastructure and
management, and more rational pricing policies are required.
Electricity: This subsector will absorb about 60 percent of total investments in commercial energy over the next decade due to its highly
capital-intensive nature and relatively high growth rates of demand. Better
optimization, especially of distribution networks, and improved demand
12. Id.
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management and pricing policies are crucial as power systems increase
in size and complexity. Particular attention must be paid to identifying
and developing hydroelectric resources, based on post-oil crisis relative
fuel price changes.
Geothermal: This resource is quite widespread, but lack of data and
clear national policy has hindered development. Reconnaissance work,
field surveys, and exploratory drilling, as well as market surveys and
studies of contractual arrangements between the potential producers and
users of geothermal steam, must be given early attention if this situation
is to be remedied.
Biomass Fuels: This energy source supplies at least half the gross
energy needs of OIDCs, mainly in rural areas where over 80 percent of
the population lives. Serious efforts have to be made in order to avoid
severe fuelwood shortages, deforestation, and attendant ills in many of
these nations within the next two decades. On the supply side, massive
afforestation schemes must be launched. These initiatives need to be
supported by the strengthening of local institutions and grass roots infrastructures, the use of low-cost tree planting methods (suited to projects
ranging from small community woodlots to large commercial fuelwood
plantations), and better integration of fuelwood programs with other rural
and agricultural activities. On the demand management side, the promotion of higher efficiency wood stoves, fuel-switching to charcoal, and
other policies, should be vigorously pursued. Most importantly, preoccupation with commercial fuels should not be permitted to dominate the
biomass subsector and starve it of resources and attention.
New Energy Sources: Systematic efforts are needed to research, adapt,
fieldtest, commercialize, and disseminate the new technologies (such as
small hydro, solar, and wind energy). However, because of site-specific
resource endowments, the economics of these schemes must be proven
on a case by case basis. While the viabilities of these technologies have
already been demonstrated, their contribution to total national energy
needs will be only a few percent, at most. To analyze the usefulness of
these technologies in specific significance, local institutional capability
must be developed to deal with the monitoring and adapting of new
discoveries and technological improvements from abroad, rather than to
unnecessarily duplicate or rediscover such advances. In any case, the
commercialization and widespread popularization of new energy sources
will remain a difficult problem for many years to come.
CONCLUSION
We conclude by noting that the broad energy policy options and specific
subsector strategies described above will remain relevant over a reason-
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able range of future oil prices. Most OIDCs have not yet fully adjusted
to the sharp increases in energy prices of the 1970s, and unless there is
a dramatic reversal of these prices relative to other goods and services
(e.g., back to pre-1973 levels), the policy options and conclusions described in this paper are unlikely to be significantly altered.
APPENDIX: LIST OF OIL IMPORTING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1. Low Income

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Kampuchea, Democratic Lao PDR, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Zaire.
2. Middle Income

Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea
(PDR), Korea (Republic of), Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mongolia,
Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen Arab Rep., Yemen
PDR, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

